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motorist statute and the policy endorsement issued thereunder
is to afford protection to the insured when they become the inno-
cent victims of the negligence of uninsured motorists" 20 give a
clear description of the legal relationships in this fact situation.
The decision is sound and well grounded, and it does away with
the uncertainty and confusion of differences previously expressed
by the courts of appeal.
21
MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
MINERAL SERVITUDES
Prescription--Effect of Unit Operations
In Barnwell, Inc. v. Carter' the question whether a mineral
servitude owner's rights remained alive turned on whether unit
drilling operations conducted within ten years of the creation
of the subject servitude interrupted prescription. The servitude
had been created in 1954. A compulsory drilling unit was formed
in 1962, and operations were conducted thereon but at a location
off the servitude tract. A second well was drilled on the servi-
tude tract and completed as a producer in 1966. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed a lower court judgment hold-
ing that prescription accruing against the servitude had been
interrupted by the unit operations.
Although the decision rendered by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Boddie v. Drewett2 had not been overruled at the time
the unit drilling operations in question were conducted, the
court chose to abide by and apply the decision later rendered in
Mire v. Hawkins.8 The latter decision expressly overruled
Boddie as to the effect of dry hole drilling operations on a unit
but at a location off a tract burdened by a mineral servitude
included in the unit. Boddie had held that the operations were
not effective as an interruption of prescription. Mire reversed
that position.
20. Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521, 527, 218 So.2d 580, 583
(1969).
21. See cases cited 4d. at 525 n.4, 218 So.2d at 582 n.4.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 220 So.2d 741 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
2. 229 La. 1017, 87 So.2d 516 (1956).
3. 249 La. 278, 186 So.2d 591 (1966).
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The supreme court has since denied writs in the Barnwell
case. Thus, it appears to furnish an answer to one of the
questions raised by Mire: that is, the retrospective effect of that
decision. It is a reasonable inference that if a mineral servitude
owner is to be given credit for unit drilling operations conducted
during the period when Boddie was effective, he will not be
given credit for suspensions of prescription which might have
occurred during that period of time. The Boddie decision had
held that although unit drilling operations, as distinguished
from production, did not interrupt prescription, the creation of
a unit including the entirety of a mineral servitude tract and
excluding that tract from the drilling area constituted an obstacle
to the use of the servitude suspending the running of prescrip-
tion. Mire reversed the Boddie decision both on the matter of
suspension and the matter of the effect of unit drilling opera-
tions as an interruption of prescription. It is on this basis that
the title examiner seems warranted in concluding that if credit
is to be given for drilling operations, no credit should be given
for suspensions resulting from the formation of drilling units
prior to the Mire decision. It appears then, that Mire is retro-
active in effect and that a title examiner must consider that it
represents the law as it always has been.
Giving Mire v. Hawkins4 retroactivity does simplify the
title system. It avoids the complexity, as well as the inequity,
which would result from the application of one rule prior to
1966 and another subsequent to that date.
Imprescriptible Mineral Servitudes
In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Freeland,5 plaintiff instituted
a concursus proceeding to determine ownership of certain
mineral rights claimed by defendant Freeland and Louisiana
State University. Within ten years from creation of a mineral
interest by defendant Freeland on land sold to Louisiana State
University, Act 278 of 1958, now La. R.S. 9:5806B, was enacted.
This statute provides that when land is acquired by certain
agencies, including a "school district, school board, or other
board, or by any commission, heretofore or hereafter created
by the State of Louisiana from any person . . . and by the act
of acquisition, order or judgment, oil, gas or other mineral or
4. Id.
5. 216 So.2d 689 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
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royalties are reserved, the rights so reserved shall be impre-
scriptible. . . ." The issue was whether that act is applicable to
the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University. The
court noted that in the enumeration of agencies covered by
the statute, the phrase "other board created by the 'State of
Louisiana" is used. This general phrase was held to make the
statute applicable to the board in question. Thus, defendant's
mineral servitude interest had not prescribed.
MINERAL ROYALTIES
Dependency on Mineral Servitude
Implicit in the ruling in Barnwell, Inc. v. Carter6 was the
concept that a mineral royalty carved out of a mineral servitude
is dependent for its continued existence on the servitude out
of which it was created. There, defendant mineral servitude
owner had created a royalty in 1959 out of his mineral servitude
created in 1954. There were, certain operations conducted in
1962, and production was ultimately obtained in 1966. If the
operations of 1962 were insufficient to interrupt prescription
accruing against the servitude, both the servitude and the
royalty carved from it would have been extinguished. The 1962
operations were deemed sufficient to preserve the mineral servi-
tude. Therefore, although the drilling operations in question
had no effect on prescription running against the royalty,
the underlying servitude was preserved, and both interests
remained in existence in 1966 when production was obtained.
Upon the occurrence of production, prescription accruing in
favor of the servitude owner and against the royalty was inter-
rupted, and the prescription accruing in favor of the landowner
against the servitude was also interrupted.
Prescription
In Lavergne v. Savoie,7 plaintiff had sold land to defendant
in 1947, reserving a mineral royalty. Production was obtained
from a well serving a unit including the royalty tract between
1949 and 1951. In 1959 a unit was established by the Com-
missioner of Conservation including the land in question, and
production commenced and was continuing at the time of
suit. Plaintiff alleged that the effect of the production between
6. 220 So.2d 741 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
7. 221 So.2d 71 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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1949 and 1951 was to suspend prescription, whereas defendant
asserted that the effect of the production during that period
was to interrupt the running of prescription. If plaintiff's argu-
ment prevailed, the royalty had prescribed. If, however,
defendant's view was accepted, the interest was alive in 1959
at the time the production from the compulsory unit com-
menced. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment of the
district court, observing that in numerous cases it had been
held that the effect of production attributable to a mineral
royalty is to interrupt rather than suspend the running of pre-
scription. There is no question about the correctness of this
decision.
MINERAL LEASES
Formalities-Parol Evidence
The parol evidence rule and the absence of the concept of
the constructive trust in Louisiana combine to make it necessary
that participants in oil and gas deals be careful to reduce their
agreements to writing and observe all appropriate formalities as
to execution. This fact is underscored by the decision in Webb v.
Duke.8 Webb had acquired certain leases. Duke claimed an in-
terest in the leases by virtue of a copy of an instrument styled a
counter letter. At the end of the copy of the letter was a blank
for Webb's signature. Following that there was a regular ac-
knowledgment form to be signed by Webb. Webb had signed in
the appropriate blank of the acknowledgment, but had not signed
where the blank for his signature appeared at the end of the
agreement. There were no witnesses; the instrument was un-
dated; and the acknowledgment was not notarized.
Webb claimed that the instrument relied on had not been
"executed" by him. He admitted that the signature appearing in
the acknowledgment was his, but stated he had no recollection
of having signed his name. Adverting to article 2275 of the Civil
Code, the court observed that as Webb was unwilling to admit
the existence of any oral agreement with Duke, Duke had to
prove his title in writing. Admitting that a private act could be
proved to establish title by proving the signature, the court never-
theless held that the signature as proven was insufficient. It was
stated that where "the signature on an instrument is affixed in
8. 211 So.2d 722 (L& App. 2d Cir. 1968).
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some unusual manner, causing doubt to arise as to whether the
person affixing same intended to execute the agreement, suffi-
cient proof must be adduced to prove the intent to execute and
deliver the instrument."9 Plaintiff Webb was still in possession
of the unsigned original, and the copy was not signed in the
proper place. Under all the circumstances the court felt that
there was no intent to execute and deliver the instrument.
While on the facts of this particular case one might argue
forcefully for either side, and while the result of this particular
case might have been the same in another jurisdiction where the
concept of constructive trust is utilized, the decision is important
because of the emphasis it places on meeting formal require-
ments in Louisiana. In this respect, Louisiana is more stringent
than other states.'0 While benefit accrues in the protection of the
title system and persons dealing on the faith of the public rec-
ords, injustice can still result from the creation of opportunities
for sharp, if not outright fraudulent, dealing. There is a need to
protect persons in the petroleum industry who make informal
agreements. It seems that where the rights of third parties who
have dealt on the faith of the public records are not endangered,
obligations of the kind alleged in this case could be enforced.
Considering the firmness with which the Louisiana courts have
enforced the parol evidence rule in these areas, it is obvious that
any action to correct this situation would have to be directed
toward the legislature.
Express Lease Clauses
Default Clause
In House v. Tidewater Oil Co.' 1 plaintiff contended that a
lease had expired after the primary term because of cessation of
production for more than ninety days without restoration or re-
sumption of production or commencement of drilling or rework-
ing operations. One of defendant's arguments was that under the
default clause, plaintiff-lessor was required to give notice that
operations were not being conducted in accordance with the lease
9. Id; at 725.
10. For a review of the entire problem of informal agreements in other
jurisdictions see Fitzpatrick, Informal Oil & Gas Deals-Unjust Enrichment,
14th INsT. ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAXATION 257 (1963). Mr. Fitzpatrick levels
some criticism at the use of the constructive trust, a specification of the
principle of unjust enrichment, on the ground that, as applied, it has created
an undesirable degree of uncertainty and instability of titles.
11. 219 So.2d 616 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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and allow time for performance before filing suit for cancella-
tion. The court held that it is settled by the jurisprudence that
the default clause is applicable only during the primary term.
Thus, no default was required.
While the jurisprudence relied on 12 can be read literally to
mean what the court said, the court reached the proper result
for the wrong reason. The distinction of significance in cases of
this kind is between express resolutory conditions's and the oc-
currence of the implied resolutory condition for nonperformance
of the contract.1 4 The Code"5 and the jurisprudence 0 require a
putting in default in the latter case, even in the absence of a
default clause. There are, however, numerous express resolutory
conditions in the standard mineral lease. True, most of these are
applicable to conditions after the primary term has run, but not
exclusively; and it is important to distinguish the two classes of
cases.
For example, if the lessee fails to make timely payment of
delay rentals, the standard mineral lease provides that "this
12. Taylor v. Kimbell, 219 La. 731, 54 So.2d 1 (1951); Sittig v. Dalton, 195
La. 765, 197 So. 423 (1940); Producers Oil & Gas Co. v. Continental Securities
Corp., 188 La. 564, 177 So. 668 (1937); Taylor v. Buttram, 111 So.2d 576 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1959); Logan v. Blaxton, 71 So.2d 675 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
All of these cases involved situations in which a resolutory condition had
occurred, or was alleged to have occurred, and the refusal of the courts to
apply the default clause was proper. However, the broad statement that the
default clause is applicable only to operations during the term of the lease
should be viewed as dictum. As noted, there are situations during the primary
term of the lease in which automatic termination occurs and no default is
required. Also, there are situations both during and after the primary term
in which the default clause would be applicable.
13. LA. Civ. COos art. 2021 provides that "if the obligation takes effect
immediately, but is liable to be defeated when the event happens, it is then
a resolutory condition." In the context of an oil and gas lease, the obligation
of the lessor is to deliver the premises for use by the lessee. This obligation
can be defeated by the occurrence of any of the express resolutory condi-
tions in the lease. See also LA. CiV. CODE art. 2026 concerning express and
implied conditions.
14. LA. Civ. Come art. 2046.
15. LA. Civ. Coos art. 1933. Reading articles 2046 and 2047 of the Civil
Code, it does not appear that a putting in default is necessary if there is a
breach of an implied resolutory condition by nonperformance when the
obligee seeks a cancellation of the contract. Article 1933 appears to require
a putting in default, except in certain specific types of cases, only if the
obligee seeks moratory, or delay, damages. However, article 1933 has been
broadly construed by the courts to require a putting In default whether the
demand is for cancellation or damages, or both. For a discussion of the
entire concept of default see Smith, The Cloudy Concept of Default, 12TH
INST. ON MINEAL LAW 8 (1965).
16. See, e.g., Bonsall v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 300 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 816 (1962); Bennett v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 275
F. Supp. 886 (W.D. La. 1967).
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lease shall expire" on the rental date unless rentals are paid.
This is an express resolutory condition. Either it occurs, or it
does not. If it occurs, the lessor's suit is not for cancellation for
nonperformance, but to have the lease declared terminated be-
cause an express resolutory condition has occurred. Obviously no
default demanding performance can be required when the lessor
contends that the lease has automatically terminated by the oc-
currence of an express resolutory condition. The same is true
if in the standard lease the lessee fails to produce, or to conduct
reworking operations, or to commence drilling operations for a
period of more than ninety days. These are all resolutory con-
ditions. Either the lease has expired automatically by its own
terms, or it has not. It is alive or it is extinguished. A demand
for performance is irrelevant, and requiring it would be an ab-
surdity. 17
Even during the primary term, if rentals are not paid, or if
production ceases, or drilling operations cease, or no reworking
operations are conducted, automatic termination would result
under many standard forms. For example, in the Bath's South
Louisiana Revised Five (5)-Pooling, it is provided that if "after
discovery and production of oil, gas or any other mineral in pay-
ing quantities, . . . the production thereof should cease from any
cause, and lessee is not then engaged in drilling or reworking
operations, this lease shall terminate unless lessee resumes or
restores such production, or commences additional drilling, or
reworking or mining operations within ninety (90) days there-
after and continues such operation without lapse of more than
ninety (90) days between abandonment of work on one well and
commencement of reworking operations or operations for the
drilling of another, in an effort to restore production of oil, gas
or other minerals, or (if during the primary term) commences
or resumes the payment of rentals in the manner hereinabove
provided for in connection with the abandonment of wells
drilled." (Emphasis added.) The italicized wording reveals that
the clause in question creates an express resolutory condition.
If production ceases at any time, the lease shall terminate unless
the lessee takes specified action. A suit under this clause is a suit
to enforce the express resolutory condition, and no demand for
performance is required.
17. For cases in which no default was required because the question was
the occurrence of resolutory conditions provided in the habendum clause,
see the cases cited at note 12 supra.
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Contrasted with actions for enforcement of express resolu-
tory conditions are those for cancellation based on nonperfor-
mance of certain obligations. For example, the lessee's express
obligation in the above-quoted lease form is to commence an off-
set well upon occurrence of certain conditions. There is no ex-
press resolutory condition in that clause of the lease, and if the
lessor is not satisfied, he must make a demand for commence-
ment of the offset well. The same is true of alleged breaches of
implied obligations.' 8 A notice of default would be required in
these situations as a prelude to suit for cancellation regardless
whether the alleged breach occurred during or after the primary
term.
Thus, the court's holding that the default clause is applicable
to operations during but not after the primary term is a mean-
ingless distinction. The question to be answered in determining
applicability of the clause is whether the suit is one for enforce-
ment of an express resolutory condition, the occurrence of which
automatically terminates the lease, or is one for cancellation based
upon nonperformance of obligations under the contract while
it remains in force, thus causing an occurrence of the implied
resolutory condition inherent in all contracts.
Reworking Operations
A second question raised in House v. Tidewater Oil Co.19
turned on a determination of whether certain operations con-
ducted by defendant lessee were sufficient to constitute rework-
ing operations within the meaning of the clause calling for re-
sumption or restoration of production or commencement of ad-
ditional drilling, reworking, or mining operations within ninety
days after cessation of production. It was undisputed that pro-
duction from the lease had ceased. On the sixtieth day thereafter
lessee commenced repair of a road and placed some heavy steel
matting around the well site in the event it should become nec-
essary to move in heavy equipment. On the eighty-fifth day, the
lessee moved in a wire line service unit to clean out the well by
removing paraffin. After eight and one-half hours, the well was
cleaned out and began to flow gas and condensate, which was
periodically flared to keep the well clean until installation of new
18. Savoy v. Tidewater Oil Co., 218 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. La. 1963), aff'd
326 F.2d 757 (1964).
19. 219 So.2d 616 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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flow lines and a tank battery. Production in paying quantities was
recommenced one hundred and eleven days after cessation.
In the course of reaching the question whether the operations
in question constituted reworking operations, the court held that
the minimal production which was obtained and flared to keep
the well clean did not constitute a resumption of production
within ninety days as required by the lease. Thus, determination
of the controversy depended on a decision whether the other
operations constituted a commencement of reworking operations
within the meaning of the lease.
The lessee put two experts on the stand who testified that
based on their experience and knowledge the use of the wire line
and scraper to clean the well out would constitute reworking
operations. Plaintiff lessor put on three experts who testified to
the contrary. The court of appeal, with one judge dissenting,
determined that the operations were reworking operations. On
application for rehearing, two members of the court, sitting en
banc, dissented from the refusal to grant a rehearing.
The testimony of experts in an instance such as this is, of
course, significant, but the question raised was one of contractual
interpretation. The issue was whether the operations were re-
working operations within the contemplation of the lease in ques-
tion, not just whether the industry in general terms would accept
the operations as reworking operations. The lease provided that
after cessation of production, it would terminate unless lessee "re-
sumes or restores such production, or commences additional drill-
ing, reworking or mining operations within ninety (90) days
thereafter...." Dissenting from the refusal to grant a rehearing,
Judge Tate analyzed the clause in question. He observed that the
lease requires that the lessee "resume or restore production or
commence additional drilling, reworking, or mining operations"
(emphasis added) within the ninety-day period. Judge Tate then
20. Id. at 627. Judge Tate also distinguished certain prior decisions re-
lied on by the majority: Johnson v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, 229 La. 446,
86 So.2d 97 (1956); Texas Co. v. Leach, 219 La. 613, 53 So.2d 786 (1951); Harry
Bourg Corp. v. Union Producing Co., 197 So.2d 172 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
Hc pointed out that only in the last cited case was the issue before the court
in the instant case decided. The operations there in question resulted in
plugging back and recompletion of a previously producing well at a higher
level. It is, as Judge Tate observed, undeniable that such operations con-
stitute reworking operations. In the other two cases there was no issue as
to whether the operations in question were reworking operations. The only
question was whether operations admitted to be reworking operations had
commenced within the time periods specified in the leases being interpreted.
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urged that the parties contemplated that there might be attempts
to restore production falling short of reworking operations. This,
he stated, was emphasized by the fact that the term "additional"
modified all three words in the series-"drilling," "reworking,"
and "mining." Further, he asserted, the usage "resume or re-
store" should be given significance. The term "resume," used
alternatively with "restore," should be interpreted as signifying
that there might be situations in which it is within the will of
the lessee to resume production which has ceased for reasons
other than the ability of the well to produce. The term "restore,"
in context, should be taken as contemplating situations in which
some operation is necessary for restoration of production and in
which restoration of production may or may not be possible for
technical reasons. He concluded that the use of a wire line and
scraper is a routine maintenance operation which should be
viewed as an attempt to restore production short of reworking
operations.
Judge Tate also felt that the lease was ambiguous and that
in keeping with the accepted rule applicable to mineral leases
the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the lessor to whom
the printed form had been presented by the original lessee.
In the particular circumstances of this case, it appears that
the obvious sincerity and good faith of the lessee, coupled with
his expenditure of $65,000, added considerable equitable appeal
to his case. Judge Tate acknowledged this, but asserted that
despite these appealing features, the lessee had simply failed to
do what the contract required.
In a sense, substantial justice may have been done in this
particular case, but insofar as the question of contractual inter-
pretation is concerned, Judge Tate's view of the matter is prefer-
able. Cleaning out a well in the fashion here involved is a rou-
tine operation. Many wells require periodic cleaning as a part
of standard operating maintenance. Such operating maintenance
should be placed within the classification of attempts to restore
production within the contemplation of this lease. As pointed
out by Judge Tate, such heavier operations as reperforation,
acidizing, squeeze cementing, sand consolidation, "fracing," and
other similar operations affecting the ability of the formation to
feed into the well bore are of the kind which should be classed
as reworking operations within the meaning of this lease. He
also observed that if in the future lessees wish to contract so as
[Vol. 30
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to achieve a different result, drafting solutions could be provided.
This last observation might be a word to the wise. Even though
the decision of the court upholds the position of the lessee, it was
by a divided court and is not a decision of the supreme court.
Pooling Clause
In McDonald v. Grande Corp.21 there was a consideration of
the controversy previously presented on motion for summary
judgment. As this case is to be the focus of a student Note to be
published in a later issue of this Review,22 the author's comments
will be limited. Briefly, the case involved allegations that the
lessee had breached a duty of fair dealing in exercising the pool-
ing power and, alternatively, that the drilling of a dry hole on
the unit formed by declaration terminated it. The court's opinion
is questionable in several respects. First, it uses language in some
instances which might be construed as meaning that the test of
whether the lessee has breached his duty of fair dealing is sub-
jective rather than objective. The wording of article 2710 of the
Civil Code, the source of the lessee's general duty to act as a good
administrator, clearly indicates an objective standard for judg-
ment.
Second, the court rejects out of hand the contention that the
drilling of a dry hole constitutes the occurrence of a resolutory
condition dissolving a declared unit. This holding is the principal
topic of the mentioned student note. It is sufficient here to say
that it is questionable to reject outright the idea that events other
than a subsequent compulsory unitization order establishing a
different unit can dissolve a declared unit.
Third, the court places emphasis on the decision in South-
west Gas Prod. Co. v. Creslenn Oil Co. 2 8 as precedent for its de-
cision that the parties in some way "froze" their agreement so
that the drilling of a dry hole would be of no effect on the con-
tinued life of the unit. That decision is inappropriate to cases of
the kind in question. Formation of a declared unit by exercise
of a pooling power is measurably different from entry by a group
of experienced oil and gas operators into an operating agreement.
Additionally, the decision in Creslenn was based on express
21. 214 So.2d 795 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). The prior decision on motion
for summary judgment in this case is at 148 So.2d 441 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 244 La. 128, 150 So.2d 588 (1963).
22. Note, 30 LA. LAW REv ...... (1969).
23. 181 So.2d 63 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
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wording in the contract, whereas there was no comparable ex-
press wording in the pooling clause in question in the McDonald
case. Courts should recognize that there is significant difference
in the structure of the two types of agreements involved in these
decisions and considerable difference in the positions of the
parties in terms of experience, bargaining power, and technical
knowledge of the parties involved. This case places lessors at a
substantial disadvantage which they will have difficulty over-
coming in that, in the vast majority of cases, the detailed pro-
visions of the pooling clause are not negotiable.
Pugh Clause
In Fremaux v. Buie2 4 plaintiff lessor was urging that a unit
had been formed by his lessee, thus making the Pugh clause25
operative and requiring payment of delay rentals on the acreage
outside the alleged unit. The instrument relied on by plaintiff
as establishing the unit was attached to his petition and dis-
closed an overriding royalty transaction between defendant and
a third party. In passing, the instrument referred to a plat of
a forty-acre area around the well in question as "the proration
or conservation unit for the first test well drilled on land covered"
by the leases in question. Nevertheless, the instrument expressly
stated that the purpose and intent of the assignment in question
was to effect a reduction in an overriding royalty.
On an exception of no cause of action, the court considered
the instrument relied on by plaintiff as part of the petition and
concluded that no unit had been formed within the meaning of
the Pugh clause. Thus, defendant's exception was sustained and
judgment rendered accordingly. There is no question as to the
correctness of this decision. There was never any reduction in
lessor's sharing arrangement concerning production. What took
place was unquestionably a working interest transaction on the
part of the lessee regarding a well on plaintiff's lease. Any other
decision than that rendered would have unreasonably limited
the lessee's freedom to deal as he wishes with his own rights in
the lease, subject always to the obligation to act as a good ad-
ministrator.
24. 212 So.2d 148 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
25. The Pugh Clause is inserted for the lessor's benefit and generally
provides that if a portion of the lease premises is included within a unit, unit
operations, either drilling or production, will maintain only that portion of
the lease included within the unit. The portion lying outside the unit must
be maintained in existence by payment of delay rentals or any form of
payment or operations which can maintain the lease.
[Vol. 30
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Royalties
In addition to the other arguments made by the lessor in
House v. Tidewater Oil Co.,26 it was claimed that defendant had
failed to pay royalties for an appreciable length of time without
justification, thus warranting cancellation of the lease. The well
in question was restored to production on November 25, 1961.
On March 9, 1962, the unit which the well served was revised by
order of the Commissioner of Conservation. No royalties were
paid to plaintiff until October 1, 1962. The defendant justified
the delay on the ground that revision of the unit caused delays to
secure surveys, title work, division orders, and other adminis-
trative requisites.
The court chose to follow the precedent in its prior decision
of Fawvor v. United States Oil of La., Inc.,2 7 viewing the delay
as justified. The development of the rule that failure to pay
royalties for an appreciable length of time without justification
constitutes an active breach of contract permitting cancellation
without a putting in default has been viewed as a device for
compelling lessees to be prompt in paying royalties and prohibit-
ing them from coercing desired action by their lessors or using
money without interest for significant periods of time.28 The
normal remedy of damages in the form of interest 29 is ineffectual.
Recent cases reveal a much more lenient attitude toward the
excuses presented by lessees.80 This relaxation in attitude may
be a response to the popularity of the game of "lease snatching"
avidly played by many lessors and their attorneys subsequent
to the articulation of the rule in question. While this counter-
reaction is laudable, the House case is a good illustration of the
fact that this sort of judicial rule-making sometimes creates
problems and results in an ultimate state of confusion as severe
26. 219 So.2d 616 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
27. 162 So.2d 602 (La- App. 3d Cir. 1964).
28. See, The Work of Louis4ana Appellate Courts for the 1964-65 Term-
Mineral Rights, 26 LA. L. REv. 542, 551 (1966); Comment, 24 LA. L. REv. 618
(1964).
29. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1935.
30. E.g., Harris v. J. C. Trahan Drilling Contractor, Inc., 168 So.2d 881
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Broadhead v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 166
So.2d 329 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Fawvor v. United States Oil of La., Inc.,
162 So.2d 602 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964). Even in those cases In which the delay
was found to be appreciable and without justification, recent decisions Indi-
cate an inclination on the part of the courts to ameliorate the remedy of
cancellation by awarding judgment for partial cancellation. See Fontenot v.
Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197 So.2d 715 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Sellers v.
Continental Oil Co., 168 So.2d 435 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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as that existing originally.8 1 It is observable in this case that the
revision of the conservation unit did not take place until three
and one-half months after the well was restored to production.
One wonders why there was a delay of almost a year in paying
royalties due under the old unit. Certainly no additional surveys,
title opinions, or division orders were required for payment of
these royalties. Yet the court chose to overlook this fact.
Considering the entire picture presented by the jurisprudence
in this area, it can only be concluded that a lessor does not know
when he can be successful in obtaining cancellation, and a lessee
does not have the security of investment which he deserves. This
state of affairs lends strong support to the suggestion made by an
able student several years ago that enactment of legislation
denying the lessor the right to cancellation for failure to pay
royalties but granting a right to double or treble the amount due,
plus interest, for unreasonable delay would solve the problem
presented. 32 The lessee would be encouraged to pay promptly, and
the lessor would be discouraged from sitting back and waiting
avariciously for the lessee to make a mistake, thus giving greater
and deserved security of investment to the lessee.
Habendum Clause
In Crane v. Sun Oil Co., 83 plaintiff executed a mineral lease,
ultimately assigned to defendant, including a particular quarter-
section of land. Attached to the lease was a plat showing the
quarter-section as a regular subdivision with an external bound-
ary on one side of forty chains, or 2,640 feet. By order of the Com-
missioner of Conservation, a plan of unitization was established
according to a plat made by defendant's surveyor, with units
established on the basis of quarter-sections. However, the ex-
ternal boundaries on the plat submitted by defendants, on the
basis of which the units were established, showed a slightly
shorter external boundary for the quarter-section in question.
Defendant, also lessee of the quarter-section lying immediately
31. This comment should certainly not be taken as expressing any view
on the part of the author that Judicial rule-making is an unusual or objec-
tionable phenomenon. Certainly the entire framework of Louisiana mineral
law would be nonexistent had the courts refused to undertake a quasi-
legislative task In carving out a system of mineral property law from a code
which was not Intended to accommodate the problem of the nature of prop-
erty rights in minerals. Rather, the remark is simply an observation that on
occasion, the rule-making or quasi-legislative function goes awry.
32. Comment, 24 LA. L. REv. 618 (1964).
33. 223 So.2d 14 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
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to the south, drilled the unit well for that quarter-section. During
the time that well was being drilled, the primary term of the
lease on the first quarter-section expired. Plaintiff made a de-
mand for an acknowledged instrument directing cancellation of
the lease from the records of the parish in which the tract was
located.84 Defendant refused, and plaintiff sued to have the lease
cancelled from the public records on the ground that the lease
had expired automatically because the primary term had run
without drilling or production.
Defendant's main argument against cancellation was that
because of the overlap in the boundaries shown on the two plats,
plaintiff's title on the northernmost tract extended a few feet
into the southernmost unit, thus including .65 of an acre of the
land in the lease on the north tract in the unit lying immediately
to the south.
The court refused to accept this argument. It was found
that the commissioner's order intended to and did divide six
sections of land into four drilling units each with the boundaries
corresponding to the quarter-section lines of each section. Ap-
parently feeling that plaintiff intended to lease only the quarter-
section in question, and adding to that the fact that the commis-
sioner's order unitized by quarter-sections, the court held that
no portion of plaintiff's property fell within the southernmost
unit, and thus the lease on the quarter-section to the north ex-
pired according to its terms.
Having concluded that the lease concerning which the suit
was brought had expired, the court awarded damages and attor-
ney's fees. It appeared that plaintiff had received a responsible
offer to lease the north quarter-section with a drilling commit-
ment on the part of the prospective lessee. The court awarded
damages measured by the cost of the well which would have
been drilled under that commitment. The supreme court has since
granted writs on the issue of damages.8 There is apparently
some question in the court's mind as to the correctness of the
measure of damages utilized by the court of appeal.
Working Interest Transactions
Operating Agreements
Two decisions dealt with disputes arising out of operating
34. The demand was made under LA. R.S. 30:102 (1950).
35. 226 So.2d 520 (1969).
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agreements. Crow Drilling & Prod. Co. v. Hunt86 required con-
-struction of an operating agreement and two letter agreements
looking toward the drilling of two wells and execution of the
operating agreement which included both wells. The question
was whether partial failure of title to leases of one party on one
of the two tracts involved and complete failure of title on the
other would alter the sharing arrangement originally agreed
upon. The court relied on prior jurisprudence taking a hard line
in the construction of operating agreements on the question of
alteration of such sharing arrangements by subsequent formation
of compulsory units with different geographical outlines8 7 to
undergird its decision that no alteration in the sharing arrange-
ment occurred. The most significant evidentiary factor was the
provision in the letter agreements that participations would re-
main the same unless there was "failure of individual titles to
leases." This was interpreted as meaning that there would be
no adjustment unless there was a complete failure of title. As
the court found there was no complete failure, no adjustment
was made. This decision may cause some concern, but there is
no problem which cannot be met by careful draftsmanship of
such agreements in the future.
Prentice v. Amax Petroleum Corp.88 contains a good object
lesson. Plaintiffs in this case procured a top lease on a certain
tract of land on which defendant had a prior lease. Defendant's
lease was later declared to have terminated.89 There was some
evidence that plaintiffs had a hand in the litigation resulting in
cancellation of defendant's lease. At a time when defendant's
lease was still in effect and when plaintiffs had already secured
a top lease on the property in question, compulsory units were
formed including portions of the subject property. Plaintiff and
defendants both held interests in the units and were parties to
operating agreements entered into by the lessees affected by the
two units. Plaintiffs claimed sole ownership of the lease in ques-
tion by virtue of their top lease. Defendant asserted that by
virtue of the operating agreements entered into, a joint venture
was formed and a mutual fiduciary relationship resulted.
36. 211 So.2d 128 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
.87. See Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 234 La.
939, 102 So.2d 223 (1958); Southwest Gas Prod. Co. v. Creslenn Oil Co., 181
So.2d 63 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
38. 220 So.2d 783 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
39. See Landry v. Flaitz, 245 La. 223, 157 So.2d 892 (1963).
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Affirming the judgment of the lower court, the court of ap-
peal held that the operating agreements expressly negated the
existence of any joint venture or fiduciary relationship. Further,
the court observed that the failure of title clause of the operating
agreement contemplated that if the title to any party in the
agreement failed, there would be a readjustment of participations
accordingly. According to the court, "such a provision would not
have been contemplated much less included in the agreements
if it was intended that participating interests lost by title failure
and acquired by another participant would inure to the benefit
of the original owner."40 The court also rejected the argument
that plaintiffs were estopped from denying defendant's owner-
ship of the lease because the operating agreement expressly stated
that at the time of entry into the agreement plaintiffs owned no
lease on the subject property when, in fact, they had acquired a
top lease on that property prior to that declaration. The court
held that there was no proof of reliance on this declaration by
defendant. Additionally, the top lease itself stated that it was not
to be effective until defendant's lease expired. Thus, plaintiffs
did not at the time of the declaration in question own a lease on
the subject property. The court also rejected defendant's con-
tention that it had entered into the agreement by error, and re-
formation was refused. Applying the terms of the unitization
agreement, defendant was not required to account for production
attributable to the property in question except from the date on
which defendant's lease was declared terminated.
Clauses of operating agreements defining the relationship
between parties to such agreements traditionally contain a nega-
tion of the creation of a joint venture, association, trust, partner-
ship, or corporation. This is partially a tax-motivated provision
in that the parties ordinarily do not want to be taxable directly
as a corporation, or as a partnership. The instant case, however,
amply illustrates that these tax-motivated provisions have a sub-
stantive legal effect. In other jurisdictions the concept of the
constructive trust often affords relief in situations similar to that
presented in this case. However, in Louisiana, where immovables
can only be acquired by title and cannot be established by parol
evidence, such protection is unavailable. Drafting solutions could
be provided, at least to a limited extent, without endangering the
tax consequences of the transaction. It remains to be seen whether
40. Prentice v. Amax Petroleum Corp., 220 So.2d 783, 788 (La. App. lot
Cir. 1969).
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operating agreements will be generally revised to provide re-
lief in this kind of situation.
Production Payments
The decision in Booksh v. Wiggins4" did not actually involve
a "working interest" transaction, as the contract was made di-
rectly with the landowners; but it is of a type which more readily
Qccurs as a working interest transaction and is thus discussed at
this point. Plaintiff operator made a contract with defendant
owners under which plaintiff was to complete a previously drilled
well which had been abandoned because the casing partially
collapsed at a point near the bottom of the hole. Subsequent
operations by persons other than plaintiff indicated that the well
was potentially productive.
i The consideration offered plaintiff in return for his services
in completing the well was a production payment in the amount
of $27,500, to be paid out of the first 3132 of the whole of produc-
tion. It was provided, however, that if plaintiff was unsuccessful
in completing the well as a producer in paying quantities, the
contract would terminate. Discussions between plaintiff and de-
fendants revealed that plaintiff recommended that the comple-
tion be made through a liner. Defendants, however, insisted that
there be an open-hole completion. Well aware of the risk involved
in an open-hole completion, plaintiff completed the well as re-
quested by defendants. The well had produced at 70 to 80 barrels
per day for a week (a total of approximately 490-560 barrels)
when it sanded up. None of the production was treated or sold.
An attempt to clean the well was made but equipment became
lodged in the tubing. Plaintiff ihen offered to clean the well and
recomplete it, using a liner, for a specified cost. The offer was
refused. Defendants granted a mineral lease to others than the
plaintiff; the well was cleaned out and completed with a liner; and
production was obtained in paying quantities.
The court held that plaintiff willingly and knowingly under-
took the open-hole completion. As his contract contained a clear
resolutory condition-that it would terminate if plaintiff did not
complete the well as a producer in paying quantities-the contract
was terminated, thus putting an end to any right plaintiff had to
participate in production.
41. 211 So.2d 429 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
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The court's construction of the contract in question is straight-
forward and correct. The only question which arises is whether
the court dealt as directly as it might have with the central
issue-whether the well was in fact completed as a producer in
paying quantities. Suppose, for example, that the well had pro-
duced for three months at the initial rate before sanding up and
that the production had been saved and sold. Would the result
of the case have been different? Certainly production at the rate
of 70 to 80 barrels per day is in paying quantities insofar as cur-
rent operating costs are concerned. Would the result have differed
if the 500 or so barrels produced had been saved and sold? Thus,
it may be asked whether the key to this case really lies in the
fact that plaintiff willingly undertook the open-hole completion,
knowing that it might sand up; or whether it is found in the fact
that the well never in fact produced in paying quantities because
the production was not saved and sold or otherwise utilized. If
the production had been saved and sold, it would almost certainly
have met current operating costs for the short period it produced,
and the terms of plaintiff's contract might have been viewed as
being fulfilled. Any subsequent difficulty encountered would not,
then, have destroyed plaintiff's right to his stated share of pro-
duction. If the well sanded up because of the method of comple-
tion chosen by defendants, this would seem to be more their re-
sponsibility than plaintiff's. And if it had ever produced in paying
quantities, no matter for how short a period of time, plaintiff
should have been adjudged to have completed his contract. Any
recompletion under those circumstances would not have termi-
nated plaintiff's interest in production.
In view of these considerations, it appears that it is implicit
in the court's opinion that the production achieved was simply
not "in paying quantities" within the meaning of the contract.
The plaintiff's knowledge of the risk of an open-hole completion
would have been irrelevant if production in paying quantities
had been achieved, regardless of the length of time for which it
continued.
CONSERVATION
Two cases raised questions as to whether particular suits
constituted attacks on orders of the Commissioner of Conserva-
tion. In Crane v. Sun Oil Co.,4 the facts of which are discussed
42. 223 So.2d 14 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
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above, it was contended that since the plat by which the commis-
sioner promulgated quarter-section units differed from the plat
by which defendant leased from plaintiff, a portion of the land
shown on plaintiff's plat as lying within one quarter-section in
fact fell in the unit serving the quarter-section to the south. It
was therefore asserted that operations on the southern unit main-
tained the lease on the northern tract as the southern unit in-
cluded .65 of an acre of the northern tract. Plaintiff claimed that
the lease on the northern tract had expired.
Among its other contentions, defendant urged that the plain-
tiff's suit would have the effect of altering the unit formed by the
commissioner if judgment were rendered for plaintiff. Thus, it
was argued that the commissioner was an indispensable party.
The court agreed with the statement of law that if the effect of
judgment would be to change the unit, the commissioner would
have to be joined. However, it was found that the result of the
judgment would not have that effect as no part of the northern
quarter-section leased by plaintiff to defendant was found to lie
within the unit to the south as established by the commissioner.
Vincent v. Hunt43 is a novel case. Plaintiff executed a mineral
lease to defendant on a tract of land later included in a compul-
sory unit. The unit was served by a well off the lease premises.
The unitization order had provided that it would be effective for
one year unless extended by order of the commissioner, which
could be done without formal hearing. Upon termination of one
year or any period of extension, the applicant was required to
call another hearing for the establishment of permanent units.
More than one year from the effective date of the order, the
commissioner issued a supplemental order extending it. At the
end of the extension, a hearing was held and a permanent unit
was established. It was plaintiff's contention that as the original
order expired by its own terms one year from its effective date
and as the commissioner could not issue a unitization order with
retroactive effect (the supplemental order), there was no pro-
duction attributable to her land for a period well in excess of
ninety days. Therefore, the lease had expired.
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and an ex-
ception to the "jurisdiction" of the court, contending that the suit
involved a direct attack on the order of the commissioner and
43. 221 So.2d 577 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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thus had to be brought in East Baton Rouge Parish. The lower
court granted both the motion and the exception. The court of
appeal affirmed on the exception but held that the motion for
summary judgment was inappropriate.
The court was correct in that plaintiff could not win her case
without proving the invalidity of the supplemental order pur-
porting to extend the original unitization order after its expira-
tion date. The supplemental order, being entitled to prima facie
validity, would have to be invalidated. Otherwise, the only judg-
ment which the court could have rendered would have been one
declaring that the lease was still in effect. Thus, success for plain-
tiff rested completely on having the court declare that the com-
missioner was powerless to issue the supplemental order and
give it retroactive effect.
The court's logic is soundly undergirded by the practical
policy consideration that the question of the authority of the com-
missioner to issue a particular order should not be resolved with-
out having him before the court. It will be interesting to follow
this case to its final determination.
MISCELLANEOUS
Mandamus to Compel Payment by Production Purchaser
Another chapter in the seemingly endless struggle by Mrs.
Marie Baucum Scott to sustain her claim to mineral rights once
owned by her father 44 was written in Scott v. Hunt Oil Co.45 Mrs.
Scott sued defendant to compel payment for sums allegedly due
her for oil and gas production under the unleased portion of the
mineral rights reserved by her father. The suit was brought
under R.S. 30:105-07. The court held, however, that the remedy
of mandamus made available by that statute was not available
to compel payment of unliquidated sums. 46 In fact, as Mrs. Scott
had previously been adjudged not to be the owner of the mineral
rights which she claimed,47 her claims were not only "unliqui-
dated and uncertain but there are no 'other sums due her' ",48 as
44. A part of the chronicle may be traced in thii-following decisions:
Ware v. Baucum, 221 La. 259, 59 So.2d 182 (1952); Scott v. Hunt Oil Co.,
160 So.2d 433 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Scott v. Hunt Oil Co., 152 So.2d 599
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
45. 219 So.2d 779 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
46. The court cited State v. Texas Gas Trans. Co., 242 La. 315, 136 So.2d
55 (1961); State v. Hope Prod. Co., 167 So. 506 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936).
47. See cases cited at note 49 supra.
48. Scott v, Hunt Oil Co., 219 So.2d 779, 780 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
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required by the statute. One can only express wonder at Mrs.
Scott's prodigious persistence.
Security Devices
Those furnishing labor, services, or supplies in connection
with the drilling or operation of oil, gas, and water wells are
granted a privilege on production, wells, leases, and equipment
to secure their claims.49 A prescriptive period of one year is speci-
fied but is interrupted if suit is brought. 50 It is further provided
that a creditor whose claim is secured by the privilege may"
enforce it by writ of sequestration without bond.51
Plaintiff in Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools v. Carthay
Land Co.52 claimed that certain other lien holders had failed to
protect their claims by filing suit within the prescriptive period
as required by the statute. It appeared that the other claimants
had proceeded by personal action against the debtor and had not
utilized the writ of sequestration. Plaintiff urged that use of the
writ was the only method by which a lienholder could proceed
in accordance with the statute.
The court of appeal distinguished other cases in which it was
held that the claimant could have only an in rem action because
in those instances there was no personal jurisdiction over the
debtor.53 In this case, however, personal jurisdiction had been
obtained, and the other claimants were not required to proceed
by writ of sequestration to preserve their claims.
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49. LA. R.S. 9:4861-4867 (1950).
50. LA. R.S. 9:4865 (1950).
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